Civil Code and Related Subjects:  Prescription by Dainow, Joseph
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 9 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1947-1948 Term
January 1949
Civil Code and Related Subjects: Prescription
Joseph Dainow
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Joseph Dainow, Civil Code and Related Subjects: Prescription, 9 La. L. Rev. (1949)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol9/iss2/10
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
opinion had merely supported its decision in favor of divisibility
by the principles in Article 803, that would have been a straight
policy determination. There was no need to try reading into the
code itself alien meanings which it does not contain and distinc-
tions which do not exist.
Revocation of Dedication of Street
Streets are usually planned at the time of the creation of
a new subdivision, and actual developments sometimes take un-
expected turns. In order to permit readjustments and the return
of dedicated areas into complete private ownership, the legisla-
ture has provided, as last expressed in Act 382 of 1938, for the
revocation by proper authorities of such dedications. In the case
of Caz-Perk Realty, Incorporated v. Police Jury of Parish of East
Baton Rouge,12 the plaintiff had created a new subdivision in
1921, with the recordation of a survey for the purpose of dedicat-
ing the streets and roads shown thereon. After the subdivision
had been developed, and as a result of one person having ac-
quired several lots as one consolidated estate, the roadway in
controversy was never improved or incorporated into the parish
system of roads. In 1942 the Police Jury of East Baton Rouge
officially revoked the dedication of the strip of road in question.
This action of the police jury was taken by virtue of the express
authority granted under Act 382 of 1938 when a street is aban-
doned or not necessary for public purposes. Since the action of
the police jury was so directly within the statutory authorization,
the contest and the bulky record could only have been directed
at the question of whether it had abused the power by acting
capriciously or arbitrarily. Although there was conflicting evi-
dence as to the necessity and usefulness of retaining the dedica-
tion, the court did not find sufficient basis to reject the police
jury's conclusion that the street was no longer used or needed
for public purposes.
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
Acquirendi Causa
For the ten-year acquisitive prescription, the Civil Code re-
quires possession coupled with good faith and just title.' Each of
these three elements has received extensive treatment by the
12. 213 La. 935, 35 So.(2d) 860 (1948).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art. 3478 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
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courts, including the decision that a quitclaim deed may be the
basis for this short prescription acquirendi causa.2 Whether this
basic decision was due to the examination of the quitclaim deed
as meeting the requirements of just title instead of evaluating its
significance in relation to the good faith element or whether it
was a deliberate policy determination is not a matter of further
concern, although the court in the recent case of Waterman v.
Tidewater Associated Oil Company4 gives an excellent footnote
history of the judicial torment which was experienced. Since this
point is no longer open to question, it was quite appropriate for
the court to insist that a quitclaim deed must satisfy the same
requirements as a regular warranty conveyance in the complete
description of the property involved. Accordingly, the court re-
jected this petitory action based on the ten-year acquisitive pre-
scription because the quitclaim deed gave an omnibus description
of two entire townships without meeting the essential require-
ment of clear identification of the actual land involved.
Cancellation of Interruption
Since acquisitive prescription does not run against the state,
there would be an interruption of the running time if a property
which was in the course of being prescribed came into the hands
of the state through a tax forfeiture. Act 310 of 1936 expressly
precluded (cancelled) any such interruption or suspension if the
property was redeemed by a purchaser in good faith with just
title, thereby putting everything into the same status as if no tax
forfeiture had occurred. Saucier v. Sondheimer Company5 is the
first case whose facts come directly within the contemplation of
the statute, which was applied. This resulted in the recognition
of defendant's ownership by acquisitive prescription because he
was a legally authorized6 purchaser in good faith with just title,
even though he was not the person who had lost the property at
the tax sale. In the earlier case of Ward v. South Coast Corpora-
tion,7 the situation appeared to be similar, yet Act 310 of 1936
was not even discussed; however, a careful examination shows
that the omission was proper because the fact situation was not
an appropriate one for the application of this statute.8
2. Smith v. Southern Kraft Corp., 202 La. 1019, 13 So.(2d) 335 (1943).
3. See Note (1944) 5 LOUISLANA LAW REVIEW 484.
4. 35 So.(2d) 225, 231, n. 2 (La. 1948).
5. 212 La. 490, 32 So.(2d) 900 (1947).
6. La. Act 41 of 1912, as amended by La. Act 175 of 1934.
7. 198 La. 433, 3 So.(2d) 689 (1941).
8. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1940-1941 Term
(1942) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 165, 208; Note (1942) 4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
335; Note (1942) 16 Tulane L. Rev. 297.
